In some countries, there was and still is an opinion that the USSR, which declared war on Japan in August 1945, committed treachery. Does such a judgment have a basis, or is it just another manifestation of Russophobia? Japan began to show its militaristic aspirations towards the USSR from the mid-thirties of the last century, some high-ranking Japanese officials even proposed the idea of expanding the borders of the empire to Lake Baikal. Shortly before the outbreak of World War II, two major clashes occurred between the Soviet and Japanese armed forces on Lake Hassan and the Khalkhin Gol River, and there was a high probability of a large-scale war. However, in the end, Japan refocused its militaristic appetites on the British dominions and the zone of interests of the United States. On April 13, 1941, a mutual neutrality pact was signed between the USSR and Japan in Moscow. According to the document, each of the parties, if it turns out to be the object of military action by other powers, was obliged to observe neutrality. Germany was not happy with the treaty, as it counted on its ally in the upcoming war with the Soviet Union. The United States and Britain were also concerned about this turn of events, realizing that Japan would now be able to strengthen its influence in the Asia-Pacific region. On June 22, 1941, Germany and its European allies invaded the USSR, but Japan complied with the agreement and stayed out of the conflict. However, this did not prevent certain circles in the Land of the Rising Sun from harboring aggressive plans against the USSR. By the beginning of July 1941, the military command had submitted a plan for the occupation of the USSR, Kantokuen, according to which the declaration of war was scheduled for August 10, 1941. It was by this date that the German troops were supposed to capture Moscow. In Manchuria, a hasty mobilization of Japanese troops was carried out, and the number of the Kwantung army doubled. Japanese Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka was most zealous for covert preparations for the invasion of the USSR. He hoped that as soon as favorable changes occurred on the German-Soviet front, Japan would immediately begin to solve the "northern problem." However, not everyone in the Japanese government liked Matsuoka's intentions, and before the end of July 1941, he was forced to leave his post. Meanwhile, the Soviet General Staff, not having much confidence in Japan, noticeably strengthened the grouping of troops in the Far East by mid-September 1941. Just as Japan was monitoring the situation on the German-Soviet front, the USSR took a wait-and-see attitude, closely monitoring the actions of the Japanese in the Pacific Theater of Operations. The more precarious Germany's position in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union became, the less Japan paid attention to its plans for the Soviet Far East. In February 1945, when the collapse of the Third Reich was only a matter of time, the leaders of the countries of the Anti-Hitler Coalition in Yalta signed an agreement that obliged the Soviet leadership to enter the war against Japan no later than 3 months after the German surrender. Stalin did not object, however, on condition that the USSR would withdraw the southern part of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. Closer to the summer, when the defeat of the Japanese forces seemed inevitable, the allies no longer insisted on opening the Soviet-Japanese front. In the memoirs of Dwight Eisenhower, then the supreme commander of the Expeditionary forces, there are words addressed to President Harry Truman: "Since the available information indicates the imminent collapse of Japan, I strongly object to the entry of the Red Army into this war." On April 5, 1945, the USSR unilaterally denounced the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact. The reason for the breakup was stated as follows: "In conditions when Japan is at war with Britain and the United States, the allies of the USSR, the pact loses its meaning and its extension becomes impossible." In Tokyo, they were perplexed: Japan has been at war with its allies for years, but wasn't this a reason for Moscow to withdraw from the agreements?
The Japanese ambassador to Moscow, Naotake Sato, remarked to Molotov that, being not annulled, but unilaterally denounced, the pact legally retains its force for another year – that is, until April 5, 1946, because under the terms of the treaty, one of the parties must warn the other about the denunciation a year in advance. Molotov agreed with this. In July 1945, when Japan's position in the Pacific Theater of Operations became critical, it turned to the USSR for help in mediating peace negotiations. Moscow replied that Stalin had left for the Potsdam Conference, and no one else was authorized to resolve such issues. According to many researchers, the Soviet leader would have rejected Japan anyway, since the USSR was interested in acquiring the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin, as well as strengthening its positions in China and Korea. On August 8, 1945, the USSR declared war on Japan, which was previously agreed upon with representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States in Potsdam. The Japanese ambassador was informed that the war would begin on August 9 at 9 a.m. only the day before at midnight Moscow time, but it was already early morning in the Far East at that time. If we consider that some time was spent on encrypting, transmitting and decrypting the report of the Japanese ambassador, then in Japan the official message was received after the start of the Soviet attack. Tokyo, of course, accused the USSR of treachery and non-compliance with the terms of the joint agreement. Not only Japan, but also its former allies characterized the behavior of the USSR as dishonorable. They drew attention to the fact that it was precisely thanks to Tokyo's non-interference in the Soviet-German war that the USSR managed to transfer Siberian divisions to the West, which played a key role in the defense of Moscow and in halting the advance of the Wehrmacht. In the USSR, they always held the opposite opinion and considered it quite reasonable to withdraw from the neutrality pact. However, this position is sometimes criticized even by domestic experts. For example, retired KGB Colonel Alexei Kirichenko draws attention to the fact that the Japanese command twice, on August 16 and 17, issued orders for the surrender of the Kwantung Army, but the Red Army, contrary to the rules, did not stop the offensive operation. The second point Kirichenko focuses on is the fate of more than 600,000 Japanese prisoners of war who were sent to Siberia and the Far East as labor. About 55,000 of them died, and the fate of another 47,000 remained unknown. The expert refers to the fact that the USSR in this case violated the Ninth Article of the Potsdam Declaration, which was signed by him. According to this article, the Soviet leadership guaranteed that after the disarmament of the Kwantung Army, Japanese servicemen would be able to return "to their homes with the opportunity to lead a peaceful and working life." The result of the Soviet-Japanese war, which lasted from August 9 to September 3, 1945, was the annexation of the territories of Southern Sakhalin, the main and southern groups of the Kuril Islands to the USSR, as well as the establishment of communist regimes in China and North Korea.
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