Several operations of the Soviet troops in the Great Patriotic War from the end of August to December 1943, which were collectively called the "Battle of the Dnieper", became a unique breakthrough in military history of the enemy's multi-kilometer defense along the wide river. In addition, it was one of the few battles of the Second World War in which tanks, aircraft and artillery took a back seat, and the main role was almost single-handedly played by ordinary rifle divisions. The battle for the Dnieper predetermined the imminent fall of Nazi Germany and the victory of the USSR in the war. On August 11, 1943, even before the end of the Soviet counteroffensive in the Battle of Kursk, Hitler ordered the immediate construction of the so-called "Eastern Rampart", a system of fortifications that, according to the Fuhrer, was supposed to delay the Red Army for a long time. The "Eastern Wall", or "Panther—Wotan Line", ran along the entire front from the Narva River in the north to the Black Sea in the south, but the fortifications on the Dnieper were the most strategically important area. The explanation is simple: it was here that the main forces of the parties were located after the Battle of Kursk and the offensive of the Soviet troops developed. However, on paper, the "Eastern Wall" looked more impressive than in reality: the Germans did not have time to finish and strengthen it properly. The beginning of the Battle of the Dnieper is considered to be August 26: on this day, five Soviet fronts launched a general offensive along the 1,400-kilometer stretch from Smolensk to the Sea of Azov. In total, 2.65 million people, 2,400 tanks, 2,850 aircraft and up to 50,000 guns were involved in the battle on the part of the USSR. The German troops were quite a bit inferior in equipment - 2,100 tanks, 2,000 aircraft, but very significantly in manpower and artillery: 1.24 million soldiers and 12.6 thousand guns. On the other hand, they had the advantage of "big water" on their side: the maximum width of the Dnieper reaches 3 km.
The first stage of the battle, which can be conditionally called the "preliminary" (Chernigov-Poltava operation), was started by the troops of the Central Front under the command of Konstantin Rokossovsky. The 60th Army of the Central Front (since October 1943 - Belorussian), breaking through to the Donbass, managed to uncover the German location south of Sevsk, the commander promptly reacted to the success and transferred large forces to this secondary sector. By the 31st, the gap in the German front had widened to 100 km wide and 60 km deep, and it became clear that the enemy would not be able to hold the Donbass. Despite fierce resistance, the Soviet troops advanced rapidly towards the Dnieper: the flat steppe made it possible to take full advantage of the numerical superiority of the armies. Chernigov was liberated on September 21, and the Germans began to withdraw quickly. At the same time, during the "run to the Dnieper," as Field Marshal Erich von Manstein later admitted in his memoirs, three of the four armies — the 1st and 4th tank and 8th — suffered heavy losses in men and equipment. By the way, as an alternative, Manstein offered Hitler to transfer 12 additional divisions to Donbass, but Germany's reserves were practically depleted after the Battle of Kursk. The Germans were the first to cross to the western bank of the Dnieper. The Soviet command faced a difficult strategic task: either to force the river on the move, preventing the enemy from strengthening, or to pull forces to the crossing points, look for weak points in enemy positions, then to break through the defenses with massive strikes, and if possible, surround and destroy enemy troops. The obvious disadvantage of the second option was that the Nazis also had the opportunity to gain a foothold in Right-bank Ukraine and bring in reinforcements. In addition, there was a risk of counterattacks by German mechanized units, which was actually Germany's main weapon from the very beginning of the war. The Stavka chose the option of a fast crossing, although it threatened the Red Army with serious losses.
The entire burden of crossing the Dnieper on a front with a total length of up to 400 km fell on the shoulders of ordinary infantry — Soviet rifle divisions. The soldiers used any available watercraft — fishing boats, rafts, sometimes even barrels, planks and logs. Already on September 22, our troops managed to capture the first bridgehead on the right bank near the confluence of the Dnieper and Pripyat, followed by another one, a little south of Kiev, in the area where the Voronezh Front joined the fighting. On the 24th, the paratroopers tried to support this bridgehead, but unsuccessfully: most of the troops, scattered over several tens of square kilometers, died in clashes with German equipment, the rest joined the partisan movement. The participation of the partisans in the battle, by the way, is worth noting separately: more than 17,000 people operated in the German rear, more than once or twice thwarting enemy attempts to throw the Soviet troops back into the Dnieper. By September 30, the heroic efforts of the rifle divisions on the right bank had recaptured more than 20 bridgeheads, and the positions were held, despite the fact that heavy equipment, for the most part, could not help the infantry. The Red Army managed to gain a foothold on the west bank at a high price: by the beginning of October, no more than 20-30% of the personnel remained in service in some of the crossed divisions.
By mid-October, the Soviet troops had accumulated large enough forces on the bridgeheads in the lower reaches of the Dnieper River, which they managed not only to defend but also to expand by bringing up tanks and artillery. In the period up to December 20, the Lower Dnieper operation was carried out by the forces of the Steppe, Southwestern and Southern fronts (in mid-October they were transformed into the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Ukrainian, respectively). During the offensive, Soviet troops occupied a section of the Right Bank up to 450 km long and 100 km wide, almost completely defeated the 6th German army in Northern Tavria, and blocked the 17th in the Crimea, which will be liberated next year. Attempts to break into the Krivoy Rog iron ore basin were stopped by mid-December by German units that received reinforcements from Europe and other regions of Ukraine. Meanwhile, the Voronezh (1st Ukrainian) Front under the command of Nikolai Vatutin launched an operation to liberate Kiev on October 12. Here, the Red Army relied on two large bridgeheads: Lutezhsky to the north of the Ukrainian capital and Bukrinsky to the south. Initially, the main attack was planned from the south, but the commander of the 3rd Guards Tank Army, Pyotr Rybalko, drew attention to the fact that the rugged terrain made it difficult to advance. Then the army was secretly transferred to the Lutezhsky bridgehead, from where it delivered a powerful blow to Kiev on November 3. It came as a complete surprise to the Germans: on November 6, the city was cleared of enemy troops. On November 13, Manstein, having concentrated large forces south of Kiev, launched a counteroffensive, and Soviet troops went on the defensive. Heavy fighting lasted until December 22. The Germans failed to recapture Kiev; by the end of the year, their noticeably thinned units had gained a foothold on the Ignatopol—Meleni—Stavishche front line.
The Battle for the Dnieper was effectively over.: The "Eastern rampart" from the upper reaches of the river to the Black Sea was breached almost the entire length. The hopes of the Hitlerite command to gain a foothold on the defensive line and prevent a further offensive by the Red Army were dashed, the complete liberation of Ukraine and the withdrawal of Soviet troops to Europe were, in fact, only a matter of time. The total losses of the USSR in the battle exceeded one and a half million people, of which about 400,000 were killed and missing. The Germans, according to various sources, lost from 300,000 to 1.2 million. The truth-man probably lies somewhere in the middle. The battle became one of the largest in the history of wars and a rare (and in scale — the only one of its kind) example of quickly overcoming a large water barrier with stubborn enemy resistance. It's interesting! The scale of the "watery" battle of the Dnieper can only be compared with the Spanish attempt to invade England across the English Channel in 1588. However, the Spanish squadron "Invincible Armada" was defeated. By the way, in World War II, Adolf Hitler had to abandon such an idea.
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